CHAPTER VIII

FORECAST ACCURACY

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has developed econometric forecast models and established a forecast process that attempts to anticipate changes that may affect the future direction of the aviation industry. Using this forecast process, the FAA annually provides 12year forecasts of aviation demand and activity measures, that are, in turn, used for aviationrelated personnel and facility planning. FAA occasionally sponsors workshops to critique techniques and practices currently used by the FAA and other aviation forecasters, and to examine the outlook for the aviation industry and its prospects for future growth. workshops focus on the forecasting process and ways to improve the reliability and utility of forecasting results.

Tables VIII-1 and VIII-2 provide some measure of the accuracy of FAA projections of aviation demand and workloads at FAA facilities. The tables compare forecasts for both short- and long-term periods. The short-term period, 1 to 5 years, is the critical period for personnel planning; the long-term period, 10 years out, is important for facility planning. The two key FAA forecasts are large carrier domestic revenue passenger miles (RPMs) and aircraft handled at FAA en route centers, the former used as one of the predictors of the latter.

For short-term trends, forecast errors normally tend to be modest. However, evaluation of the 2004 forecasts demonstrates the impact that the changing dynamics of the industry since September 11th can have on forecast accuracy. As a result of the continuing restructuring efforts of the legacy carriers, the 2004 domestic mainline carrier RPM forecast was 2.6 percent lower than the actual results for the year-488.4 billion compared to a forecast of 475.9 billion. On the other hand, the forecast for domestic enplanements was right on the mark in 2004-502.2 million compared to a forecast of 502.4 million. The larger forecast error in domestic RPMs reflects the legacy carriers' continuing transfer of medium distance routes to its smaller regional affiliates as well as its increased service in transcon routes in response to increased competition from low-cost carriers. In 2003, the FAA had predicted that the domestic passenger trip length would increase by 8.1 miles, assuming that there would be a gradual slowing in the number of routes transferred to its regional partners. Instead, the rapid run-up in oil prices in 2004 forced legacy carriers to once again transfer large numbers of routes to its regional affiliates, the result being a 33.5 mile increase in the passenger trip length.

¹The definition of air carriers was changed in 2002 to exclude regional/commuters reporting on Form 41. Previous forecasts were rebased using the new historical database and previous forecast growth rates.

TABLE VIII-1

U.S. MAINLINE AIR CARRIERS SCHEDULED DOMESTIC REVENUE PASSENGER MILES (RPMs) FORECAST EVALUATION

		Forecast RPMs					
Year Being	Actual	(Billions)					
Forecast	RPMs	Published Years Earlier					
	(Billions)	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years	5 Years	10 Years
1997	434.6	433.2	420.3	426.6	399.9	422.0	507.5
1998	444.7	453.0	451.6	441.0	443.8	414.9	509.2
1999	463.1	455.0	467.6	467.7	455.2	459.5	496.4
2000	490.0	479.0	466.1	482.4	484.1	469.6	492.6
2001	483.8	506.3	493.9	477.9	498.8	501.4	485.0
2002	443.2	425.8	527.0	515.7	505.7	528.8	509.8
2003	453.4	455.6	485.4	548.1	533.2	527.5	499.9
2004	488.4	475.9	473.0	507.7	571.7	556.2	553.3
2005		496.7	502.6	489.6	530.6	596.9	567.6
2006			521.1	521.7	506.5	553.1	622.1
2007				541.4	539.4	523.9	649.6
2008					558.7	558.8	650.4
2009						577.7	691.8
2010							737.1
2014							686.8

Year Being Forecast	Forecast RPMs Percent Error PublishedYears Earlier					
	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years	5 Years	10 Years
1998	1.9	1.5	(0.8)	(0.2)	(6.7)	14.5
1999	(1.8)	1.0	1.0	(1.7)	(0.8)	7.2
2000	(2.3)	(4.9)	(1.6)	(1.2)	(4.2)	0.5
2001	4.7	2.1	(1.2)	3.1	3.6	0.3
2002	(3.9)	18.9	16.4	14.1	19.3	15.0
2003	0.5	7.1	20.9	17.6	16.3	10.3
2004	(2.6)	(3.2)	3.9	17.0	13.9	13.3

Note on how to read this table: In 2003 the FAA forecast 475.9 billion RPMs would occur in 2004. In fact, 488.4 billion RPMs were recorded, meaning the forecast was 2.6 percent lower than actual.

The 2005 forecast is shown in bold italics.

TABLE VIII-2

FAA ARTCC AIRCRAFT HANDLED FORECAST EVALUATION

		Forecast Activity Level					
Year Being	Actual	(Millions)					
Forecast	Activity		Published Years Earlier				
	(Millions)	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years	5 Years	10 Years
1997	41.4	40.9	42.2	41.5	40.3	40.7	46.0
1998	43.2	42.0	41.8	43.4	42.4	41.1	46.1
1999	44.7	44.2	42.6	42.5	44.4	43.4	46.0
2000	46.0	45.7	45.2	43.2	43,5	45.3	47.1
2001	45.2	47.0	46.8	46.2	44.2	44.4	46.6
2002	43.7	43.2	48.1	48.0	47.3	45.2	45.1
2003	43.7	43.6	45.4	49.3	49.0	48.4	45.0
2004	46.2	45.1	44.8	46.5	50.4	50.1	47.3
2005		46.9	46.8	46.0	47.6	51.8	49.3
2006			48.5	47.9	47.0	48.6	48.5
2007				49.7	48.9	48.0	49.6
2008					50.7	49.9	54.2
2009						51.7	56.7
2010							58.6
2014		,					57.5

Year Being Forecast	Forecast Activity Percent Error PublishedYears Earlier						
real Being Polecast	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years	5 Years	10 Years	
1998	(2.8)	(3.2)	0.5	(1.9)	(4.9)	6.7	
1999	(1.1)	(4.7)	(4.9)	(0.7)	(2.9)	2.9	
2000	(0.7)	(1.8)	(6.1)	(5.5)	(1.6)	2.3	
2001	4.0	3.5	2.1	(2.3)	(1.8)	3.0	
2002	(1.2)	10.1	9.8	8.2	3,4	3.1	
2003	(0.4)	3.8	12.7	12.0	10.6	2.9	
2004	(2.3)	(3.0)	0.6	9.1	8.4	2.3	

Note on how to read this table: In 2003 the FAA forecast 45.1 million aircraft would be handled in 2004. In fact, 46.2 million aircraft were recorded, meaning the forecast was 2.3 percent lower than actual.

The 2005 forecast is shown in bold italics.

Over the last 7 years, the average absolute 1-year RPM forecast error is 2.5 percent (2.5 percent for the 6 years prior to 2004, and 2.9 percent for the 5 years prior to 2003). The average 1-year forecast error is (0.5) percent for the 7 years--4 of the forecast years being underestimated and 3 of the forecast years being overestimated.

The forecast for aircraft handled in 2004 was 45.1 million compared to an actual of 46.2 million--resulting in the forecast being 2.3 percent lower than actual. This larger than average forecast error also reflects continuing legacy carrier restructuring and transfer of routes to their smaller affiliates. In addition, FAA military forecasts assume, for lack of any information regarding future military activity, that military activity will remain constant at its last reported activity level. Military operations increased 4.4 percent in 2004, the added activity accounting for almost 16 percent of the forecast error in 2004.

The average absolute 1-year forecast error over the last 7 years is 1.8 percent (1.7 percent for the 6 years prior to 2003, and 2.0 percent for the 5 years prior to 2003). The average 1-year forecast error is 0.7 percent, with 6 out of the last 7 forecasts underestimating the number of aircraft handled.

The 10-year out forecast errors tend to be larger because of unanticipated external events that have long-term impacts on the aviation system. Contributing external factors impacting the long-term forecasting accuracy of RPMs and aircraft handled include the 1991 Gulf War and the concomitant rise in fuel prices; the outbreaks of terrorism in 1986, 1991, and 2001; the Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1997-98; the War in Iraq along with the outbreak of SARS in 2003; and the rapid rise of oil prices in 2004. Since the FAA does not use cyclical economic projections in preparing its long-term forecasts, the 2001 economic recession was not considered in any of the forecasts prepared prior to 2001.

For the 7-year period 1998 through 2004, the average absolute 10-year forecast error for domestic RPMs is 8.7 percent and the average absolute 10-year forecast error for aircraft handled is 3.3 percent. The evaluation of forecasts published in 1994 (for 2003) and 1995 (for 2004) indicate that the forecast error for domestic RPMs was 10.3 and 13.5 percent, respectively. For aircraft handled, the error for the forecasts published in 1994 and 1995 was 2.9 and 2.3 percent, respectively. This statistical comparison highlights the significant impact that unanticipated exogenous events, or the lack thereof, can have on the long-term accuracy of the forecasts. It should also be noted that the errors for forecasts prepared prior to 2002 will continue to widen because of the events of September 11th.

THE FAA AVIATION FORECASTING PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

The FAA's forecasting process is a continuous and interactive one that involves the FAA Statistics and Forecast Branch, as well as other FAA offices, government agencies, and aviation industry groups. In addition, the process uses various economic and aviation databases, econometric models and equations, and other analytical techniques.

Forecasting aviation activity is an essential component of the FAA's planning process. The forecasts are used to determine staffing levels and capital expenditures required to accommodate the growth of aviation activity while maintaining a safe, secure, and efficient environment. The forecasts are also used for short-term budget preparation and trust fund, cost-benefit and regulatory analyses.

The relative importance of the forecasting function in the planning process can be gauged by examining the National Airspace System (NAS) Architecture. The NAS architecture is a 15-year plan, with the first 5 years focusing on the Capital Investment Plan (CIP). The CIP identifies the short-term requirements for sustaining and improving the safety, security, and efficiency in the NAS. The sizable investments being made in the National Airspace System make it essential for the FAA to develop and use the most accurate and reliable forecasts possible. Thus, the periodic review and evaluation of the forecasting procedures, models, assumptions, and results constitute essential parts of the process.

The FAA considers over 100 variables when producing a set of national forecasts. Of these, four economic independent variables are obtained from sources external to the FAA. Consequently, the FAA has no control over these truly exogenous variables. 12 quantifiable air carrier forecast assumptions and 3 quantifiable regional/commuter carrier forecast assumptions. These forecast assumptions are made by FAA analysts who develop the forecasts. There are 83 aviation variables that are not FAA workload measures, but influence the workload measures in one way or another. Finally, there are over 30 aviation variables that are workload measures used by the FAA for policy and planning considerations, and for personnel and investment planning.

Table VIII-3 at the end of this chapter contains a list of the variables, the sources of the data, and their relationship to the forecast process. Forecasts of the economic variables are developed outside the FAA. All other forecasts are developed by the FAA.


Research undertaken in the early- and mid-1970s indicated that some measures of economic activity (such as gross domestic product or total employment) and some measures of prices (for example, airline fares and aviation fuel prices) were useful predictors of aviation activity. Some unique events (including the failure of U.S. air carriers to follow rational pricing policies; e.g., the destructive fare wars of 1986 and 1992; the prolonged depressed state of the general aviation manufacturing industry; and the September terrorist attacks) have altered the relationships between key aviation variables and the economic variables used previously. It has been difficult, therefore, to produce economic or econometric models that predict aviation activity with the same degree of reliability as the models developed in earlier periods. Thus, for the present, the forecasters must rely to a greater degree on subjective judgment, evaluation, and expertise than was required previously. This is not at all unusual in times when significant structural changes are taking place in a volatile industry.

THE FAA FORECASTING PROCESS

During the past several years the FAA has adopted a decision-theoretic forecasting system. The approach is generally accomplished in two stages. Initially, projections are made with the use of econometric and time-series models. The model equations and outcomes are then adjusted based upon "expert industry opinion" to arrive at posterior forecasts for use in the decision-making process. The flow diagram on page VIII-6 shows a generalized version of the FAA aviation forecasting process.

In light of the continuing changes occurring in the industry, this year's forecast process was similar to the process put in place after September 11th. Near-term forecasts (2005) were developed utilizing assumptions regarding capacity and expert judgment as to the degree and timing of the industry recovery. For the remaining years (2006-2016) the air carrier forecasts were based on results derived from econometric and time-series models. The

FAA FORECASTING SYSTEM



regional/commuter forecast combined assumptions relating to capacity as well as results from econometric models. It is believed that optimum policy forecasts can only be achieved by combining model forecasts and judgment.

In general, these models are relatively simple descriptions of very complex systems. They cannot account for all the political, social, psychological, and economic factors and their interactions that will lead to a particular set of outcomes. Therefore, it is essential to use judgment to account for the complexities of the operating environment. This can be accomplished by adjusting the exogenous variables, adjusting the model outputs, or revising the models initial parameter estimates.

FORECASTING EVALUATION

It is important to evaluate the forecast results and to determine the causes of the deviations of the forecast values from the actual values observed in the real world. Large forecast errors can lead to inefficient allocation of resources which, in turn, could lead to capacity constraints and delays or to excess capacity in the National Airspace System. For this reason, the FAA continuously evaluates the forecasting process and its results.

The analysis of the errors generally identifies the causes of the deviations and helps determine the improper proportion due to model specifications, erroneous forecasts of independent variables, erroneous forecast assumptions, or incorrect judgments and opinions. warranted, the forecast error analysis may lead to a reformulation or respecification of the model and to additions or deletions of independent variables, revisions of forecast assumptions, and/or changes in analysts' opinions and judgments about future events.

The evaluation of the forecast process proceeds on several fronts. On a monthly basis, the FAA tracks its short-term forecasts of commercial air carrier traffic (enplanements and RPMs), aircraft operations, instrument operations, IFR aircraft handled, and flight services vis-à-vis actual carrier traffic data reported to DOT and actual activity counts at the FAA facilities. This tracking system alerts FAA management to unexpected deviations from the trends suggested by the forecasts. Inquiries are then initiated to determine the cause(s) of the differences and revised short-term forecasts may be generated, if necessary.

To help the analysts make correct decisions and informed judgments when developing the forecast assumptions, the FAA meets with industry representatives to discuss industry trends, recent developments, and possible future courses of events. In cooperation with the National Academy of Sciences, Transportation Research Board (TRB), the FAA has, since 1979, sponsored a biennial International Workshop on Future Aviation Activities--"Forecast Assumptions Workshop." This "by invitation only" workshop is attended by some 120-140 industry planners and forecasters representing airlines, aircraft manufacturers, manufacturers, trade associations, academic institutions, and other industry groups.

Generally, workshop participants are divided into nine concurrent panels to discuss sectoral trends and problems in the following areas: (1) domestic air carriers, (2) international air carriers, (3) regional and commuter airlines, (4) air cargo, (5) airports and infrastructure, (6) commercial aircraft fleets and manufacturers, (7) light personal and general aviation, (8) business aviation, and (9) vertical flight (rotorcraft).

The subgroups are instructed to critique FAA aviation forecasts for their specific areas. Each subgroup is asked to identify specific assumptions about the short- and long-term future trends of the economic and aviation

variables that are important to their segments of the industry, to indicate why these trends are considered important, and to explain why specific trends are anticipated. After discussing the FAA forecast and the group's assumptions, each group attempts to reach a consensus about the key variables affecting the industry and the most likely future courses of these variables. The findings of these workshops are published by the TRB.

In past years, the TRB workshops have provided discussions beneficial to both government and industry participants, while at the same time providing FAA analysts with a benchmark for preparing future aviation forecasts and for evaluating forecasts prepared by other organizations. These meetings are even more valuable for gaining insight, as the industry continues to be impacted by major world events.

Throughout the year formal and informal meetings with individuals and representatives of specific aviation groups are held, and this is another method used by the FAA to solicit input and comments on FAA forecasts. Meetings are held regularly with aircraft manufacturers and with members of the various aviation trade associations. In addition, FAA analysts maintain one-on-one contact with many industry representatives and also attend conferences/meetings conducted by the aviation trade associations when the budget permits.

The largest setting for industry dialogue and critique regarding the FAA aviation forecast process is the annual FAA Aviation Forecast Conference. Now in its 30th year, the conference provides a forum for the release of its aviation forecasts for the upcoming 12 years. The last conference was held March 25-26, 2004, in Washington, DC. Participants and

attendees were over 600 strong and included airline and airport executives, aircraft and engine manufacturers, trade associations, aviation consultants, consumer groups, industry representatives, and the news media. To the maximum extent possible, the FAA responds to questions raised about the forecasts both during and after the conference.

An important part of the conference is the opportunity for government and industry leaders and experts in the aviation industry to make presentations on a variety of topics of interest to the aviation community. The FAA also receives valuable information and insights through the papers presented at the forecast conference. Last year's conference proceedings can be found at the following web address: http://api.hq.faa.gov/conference/2004/web%20agenda.htm

Finally, the FAA requests FAA regional and state participation in the evaluation of the forecast process. For example, the aircraft handled and terminal area forecasts are distributed to FAA regional offices for review and comment. The comments and changes are incorporated in final facility-level reports. In the case of terminal area forecasts, the FAA regions can make changes directly on personal computers. However, the final facility-level forecasts derived by this procedure must be consistent with the national forecasts.

Periodically, the FAA prepares technical reports comparing forecast accuracy of key workload measures with forecast accuracy of economic variables prepared by the major forecasting services. Based on the results of these studies, the FAA forecasts compare favorably with those produced by the major forecasting services.

TABLE VIII-3

FAA AVIATION FORECAST VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES

TYPES OF VARIABLES AND VARIABLE NAMES

HISTORICAL DATA SOURCES

ECONOMIC

ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Consumer Price Index – All Urban Consumers (CPIU)

Oil and Gas Deflator

OMB, CBO, Global Insight

OMB, Global Insight

OMB, Global Insight

CBO

AIR CARRIER

FORECAST ASSUMPTIONS

Domestic Operations

Average seats per aircraft

Average passenger trip length²

Revenue per passenger mile (current \$)

Revenue per passenger mile (2004 \$)

Average jet fuel prices (current \$)

BTS/computed

BTS/computed

BTS/computed

Computed

BTS/computed

Computed

International Operations (U.S. Carriers)

(Same as Domestic) (Same)

SCHEDULED PASSENGER TRAFFIC

Domestic

Revenue passenger miles (RPMs)

Revenue passenger enplanements

Available seat miles (ASMs)

BTS

BTS

BTS

Computed

International (U.S. Carriers)

RPMs by World Regions BTS
Revenue passenger enplanements by World Regions BTS

²Result of econometric models for RPMs and Enplanements

FAA AVIATION FORECAST VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES (CONTINUED)

TYPES OF VARIABLES AND VARIABLE NAMES

HISTORICAL DATA SOURCES

AIR CARRIER (CONTINUED)

International (U.S. Carriers)

ASMs by World Region BTS

Load factors Computed

International (U.S. and Foreign Flag Carriers)

Passenger enplanements INS

SCHEDULED AND NONSCHEDULED CARGO TRAFFIC

Domestic and International (U.S. Flag Carriers)

Total Air Cargo Revenue Ton Miles (RTMs)

Air Cargo RTMs: All-Cargo Carriers

Air Cargo RTMs: Passenger Carriers

BTS

BTS

FLEET

Large jet aircraft: Passenger FAA
Large jet aircraft: Cargo FAA

HOURS FLOWN BY EQUIPMENT TYPE

Large jet aircraft BTS

FUEL CONSUMED

Jet

Domestic air carriers BTS
International air carriers BTS

General aviation FAA/APO-110

Aviation Gasoline FAA/APO-110

FAA AVIATION FORECAST VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES (CONTINUED)

TYPES OF VARIABLES AND VARIABLE NAMES HISTORICAL DATA SOURCES

REGIONAL/COMMUTER

FORECAST ASSUMPTIONS

Average seats per aircraft

Average passenger trip length

Average load factor

BTS/Computed

BTS/Computed

BTS/Computed

PASSENGER TRAFFIC

Revenue passenger enplanements BTS RPMs BTS ASMs BTS

FLEET

Aircraft less than or equal to 90 seats FAA

HOURS FLOWN

Total for all passenger airlines BTS

GENERAL AVIATION

FLEET

Active aircraft by equipment type FAA/APO-110

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BY REGION

Total aircraft in each of nine FAA Regions FAA/APO-110

HOURS FLOWN

Hours flown by equipment type FAA/APO-110

FUEL CONSUMED

Fuel consumed by equipment type FAA/APO-110

PILOTS

Active pilots by certificate type FAA/Mike Monroney

Aeronautical Center

FAA AVIATION FORECAST VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES (CONTINUED)

TYPES OF VARIABLES AND VARIABLE NAMES HISTORICAL DATA SOURCES

FAA WORKLOAD MEASURES

FAA TOWERS	
Number of FAA Towers	FAA/APO-130
Number of Contract Towers	FAA/ATP-140
Aircraft Operations:	
Itinerant and local operations by aviation category	FAA/APO-130
Instrument operations by aviation category	FAA/APO-130
Non-IFR Instrument Operations:	
Terminal control areas	FAA/APO-130
Expanded radar service areas	FAA/APO-130
AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS	
IFR departures by aviation category	FAA/APO-130
IFR overs by aviation category	FAA/APO-130
FLIGHT SERVICE STATIONS	
IFR-DVFR flight plans originated	FAA/APO-130
VFR flight plans originated	FAA/APO-130
Pilot briefings	FAA/APO-130
Aircraft contacted by aviation category	FAA/APO-130
IFR-DVFR aircraft contacted	FAA/APO-130
VFR aircraft contacted	FAA/APO-130

FAA AVIATION FORECAST VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES (CONTINUED)

TYPES OF VARIABLES AND VARIABLE NAMES

HISTORICAL DATA SOURCES

TERMINAL AREA FORECASTS (3,444 Towered and Nontowered Airports)

ENPLANEMENTS

BTS U. S. Flag Carrier Foreign Flag Carrier **INS/BTS** Regional/Commuter BTS

Air Taxi FAA/VNTSC

OPERATIONS

Towered Airports:

Aircraft operations by aviation segment FAA/APO-130

Scheduled commuter OAG

FAA/NFDC **Nontowered Airports**

Scheduled commuter OAG

APO-110--Statistics and Forecast Branch, FAA

APO-130--Information Systems Branch, FAA

ATP-140--Contract Air Traffic Services, FAA

BTS--Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Department of Transportation

CBO--Congressional Budget Office

Global Insight--formerly DRI-WEFA, Inc.

INS--Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice

NFDC--National Flight Data Center, FAA

OAG--North American Official Airline Guide

OMB--Office of Management and Budget

VNTSC--Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Research and Special Programs Administration, Department of Transportation